CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND FORTIETH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 2 February 1993, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Celso Luiz Nunes Amorim (Brazil)

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The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 640th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset I wish to welcome warmly, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Ambassador Grigory Berdennikov, who is our first speaker today. Ambassador Berdennikov is a career diplomat, responsible at present for matters relating to arms control and disarmament in the Foreign Ministry. Such a responsibility is the culmination of a long and brilliant career devoted to disarmament, during which he participated in the work of this Conference, as well as in the deliberations of the First Committee of the General Assembly. He left behind many friends in the Conference who, I am sure, are very happy to see him back.

I should also like to extend a warm welcome, on behalf of all of us, to the new representative of Hungary, Ambassador György Boytha, who is attending the plenary meeting for the first time. In doing so, I should also be grateful if he could convey to his predecessor, Ambassador Tóth, our best wishes for success in his new responsibilities. We have very good memories of the work done by Ambassador Tóth, and I am sure that he will continue to serve his country very effectively. May I assure Ambassador Boytha of my cooperation and that of my delegation in our joint endeavours in this Conference?

I wish to inform you that, once the list of speakers is exhausted, I shall put before the Conference the appointment of the chairmen of the ad hoc committees on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and on transparency in armaments.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, Mexico and Germany.

I now give the floor to His Excellency the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Ambassador Grigory Berdennikov.

Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, first of all allow me to thank you for the kind words addressed to me and in turn offer you my greetings as the representative of the friendly country of Brazil and, through you, all the participants in this unique multilateral forum on disarmament issues and wish you success in you work in this important area of international politics. I should also like to offer greetings to the Secretary-General, of the Conference, Mr. Vicente Berasategui, who plays an important role in the work of this forum.

A fundamental task at the present stage is, in our view, to ensure that the process now under way of deep cuts in the mountains of weapons accumulated during the "cold war" years becomes irreversible, and to establish reliable guarantees that the physical structures for military confrontation will not be re-created, while at the same time strengthening the security of all countries. Perhaps what is most important at present is to ensure the practical implementation of already concluded multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements which form a broad juridical basis for genuine

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disarmament and which cover most though not all of the traditional disarmament agenda as it was drawn up in the 1970s and 1980s. And this is natural, because if all States do not discharge their commitments in this regard in a conscientious and timely manner it will hardly be possible to seriously expect the adoption of even more far-reaching agreements. Moreover, one may discern ever more clearly the outlines of a broad set of complex issues related to the elimination and recycling of weapons released by the cuts, without adverse environmental impacts and at minimal economic cost. Russia stands ready to contribute to tackling these tasks as its abilities permit.

Russia no longer has adversaries identified once and for all on ideological grounds. However, like any other State, we have our national interests which we would like to realize on the basis of cooperation and partnership with all countries ready to do so. We consider that for the realization of these interests we have an important instrument in the Conference on Disarmament, which should in our opinion remain a multilateral negotiating forum in the field of arms control and security. And in this respect the elaboration of the Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons recently signed in Paris offers indisputable evidence of the vitality of the Conference on Disarmament. The Convention is an outstanding achievement of multilateral diplomacy. It sets unprecedented standards of openness and cooperation in the field of security on a global scale. Practically all States in the world have succeeded in agreeing not only on eliminating chemical weapons as a means of war but also on the destruction of this class of weapon of mass destruction subject to effective international verification. We hope that under this Convention a flexible, effective and not excessively costly international mechanism will be established for its implementation. Our country has been involved with this Convention from the outset and has striven in every way to make it a reality. Having signed the Convention, we recognize the scope of the commitments entered into by Russia. In the difficult economic conditions being experienced by our country we will have to develop an environmentally sound capability to destroy 40,000 tons of CW agents, address economic and social issues and provide employment for people previously in CW-related occupations. We are grateful to those countries which have expressed their readiness to assist Russia in the destruction of chemical weapons and fulfilling other commitments under the Convention.

As of today the Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons has been signed by more than 130 States. The most important task now is to ensure the genuine universality of the Convention membership in order to make the prohibition of chemical weapons really global. Russia for its part is taking measures through diplomatic channels to achieve this objective.

I think that it is definitely historically appropriate that the Paris ceremony for the signature of the chemical weapons Convention took place just a few days after another important event in the area of disarmament - the signing in Moscow of the START 2 Treaty. Thus the efforts at both multilateral and bilateral levels covering both nuclear and chemical weapons have been crowned with success practically simultaneously. The Moscow Treaty, which provides for the biggest ever reduction of nuclear arsenals - by two-thirds from their present levels - represents a tangible embodiment of the new relations of partnership and cooperation in the field of arms limitation and reduction between yesterday's major political adversaries. Such a view of

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this Treaty is all the more justified as the START 2 Treaty provides not for the mere elimination of strategic arms which have become obsolete, but for the deliberate removal from the arsenals of both sides, or the substantial reduction, of the most destabilizing strategic systems. Thus, one important element of the Treaty relates to the mutual obligations of the parties concerning elimination of the latest American MX "Peacekeeper" ICBM and Russian SS-18 heavy missiles and a substantial (half to two-thirds) cut in strategic nuclear warheads deployed in the naval and airborne components of the strategic triad. The START 2 Treaty also corrects distortions which may have appeared as a result of the implementation of START 1, primarily because of the right stipulated under START 1 not to count the actual number of nuclear armaments on heavy bombers. The provisions of the START 2 Treaty will lead to a situation where all the strategic offensive armaments of the two parties will be counted for the first time. The START 2 Treaty leaves no loopholes for bypassing the counting rules, as it provides for strict verification procedures.

It must also be pointed out that the extent of the cuts in strategic offensive weapons provided for under the new Treaty is not only in keeping with the new international circumstances but is also tailored to Russia's economic capacities. The new Treaty offers proof of the mutual readiness of the parties to take into account one another's economic interests and avoid assuming treaty obligations that would entail unjustified material outlays. Also of key importance for maintaining strategic stability is the intrinsic interrelationship, reaffirmed under the new Treaty, between the implementation of the reductions provided for under START 1 and START 2 and compliance by Russia and the United States of America with their obligations under the ABM Treaty. In the context of deep cuts in strategic offensive weapons being pursued by Russia and the United States of America, the significance of the ABM Treaty becomes even greater. I hope that here at the Conference on Disarmament the efforts aimed at radical nuclear disarmament which we have made together with the United States of America will be properly received, inter alia in the context of the readiness of the nuclear Powers to honour their commitments under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In this respect I cannot fail to mention the need for Ukraine and Belarus to ratify the START 1 Treaty rapidly and, together with Kazakhstan, to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as non-nuclear States. Almost a year has passed since, in May 1992, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus assumed the obligation under the Lisbon Protocol to accede in the shortest possible time to the non-proliferation Treaty as States which did not possess nuclear weapons. Frankly speaking I shall not conceal that we are concerned at the fact that the "shortest possible time" mentioned in the Lisbon Protocol is being stretched out or, hedged about with conditions, as unfortunately is happening in the case of the Ukraine. The START 2 Treaty has intrinsic links with the START 1 Treaty and can only enter into force and be implemented in conjunction with it. Those who, deliberately or not, are now placing new obstacles in the path of the START 1 Treaty and the Lisbon arrangements which form an integral part of it should understand the degree of responsibility they are taking on vis-à-vis the whole of mankind. Both the fate of nuclear disarmament, and the future of the nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime are at stake. This problem concerns all countries without exception.

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Although the East-West confrontation is gone, the world has not yet entered a state of genuine stability. New challenges to international security have emerged. Among them are regional crises and conflicts of which we unfortunately have direct experience, and the danger that the whole world will be overrun by the most modern and lethal weapons, principally weapons of mass destruction and missiles as well as technologies for their production and so forth. In this context we consider that the United Nations Secretary-General's report entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold war era" is timely and useful. As the Conference on Disarmament is due to express its views on the Secretary-General's report soon, I would like to suggest that it should be given active and unambiguous support by this forum. In this respect we would specifically like to highlight such points in the report as the need for the integration of disarmament and arms control issues into the broader structure of the international agenda, the globalization of the disarmament process and further intensification of efforts in this area. We also consider the main points of reference in the area of disarmament as contained in the report, including the nuclear test ban, ensuring transparency in armaments, conversion, etc., to be correct. We also support the emphasis placed in the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the issue of non-proliferation, and we welcome the fact that a process of unofficial consultations on this issue among interested States began last year in the Conference on Disarmament. Non-proliferation is undoubtedly the most important guarantee of, and an indispensable condition for, further deep cuts in nuclear arsenals. The efforts of the international community to curb the spread of weapons of mass destruction will to a great extent determine the development of international relations in the foreseeable future.

Of cardinal importance is the forthcoming 1995 conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which is to take a decision on extending it. We share the view of the United Nations Secretary-General that there is a need to make this unique document universal and of unlimited duration. For over 20 years since it was adopted the Treaty has proved to be an effective instrument for strengthening international security. The norms embodied in it have received general recognition. Over 150 States are now parties to it. It is important that its membership has been steadily expanding in recent years. In this context we would like to note the accession of France and China to the Treaty, with the result that as of today all the nuclear States have contracted obligations under this treaty. We also welcome the accession of South Africa and other States of the African continent to the Treaty.

This non-proliferation Treaty makes it possible to respond adequately to problems related to the emergence of new States on the territory of a nuclear super-Power - the former USSR. All these countries have declared their support for the non-proliferation Treaty and their readiness to become parties to it. Within the context of the Commonwealth of Independent States support was expressed for the role of Russia as the sole nuclear Power on the territory of the former USSR and as a depositary of the non-proliferation Treaty. We welcome the fact that a number of independent States which were formerly part of the USSR have already officially acceded to the Treaty, and we count on other countries which have not yet done so following suit. I would like to stress once again that the emergence of new nuclear States anywhere would be a blow to this Treaty and to the very foundations of

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strategic and nuclear stability in the world. Russia will make every possible effort to avert such a situation, and we count on interaction with other States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty on this issue. We share the view of the United Nations Secretary-General that "there can be no justification for any State, anywhere, to acquire the tools and technologies of mass destruction". The United Nations Secretary-General was absolutely right to recall that at its meeting in January 1992, attended by the highest State leaders, the Security Council declared that the proliferation of nuclear and indeed all types of weapon of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security.

Of course, global efforts aimed at non-proliferation should be combined with regional measures. In this context Russia, as one of the co-chairmen of the Middle East settlement process, supports an approach under which all countries of the region would renounce possession of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The Conference on Disarmament might also contribute to solving the problem of non-proliferation, both in terms of political points of reference and in solving a number of technical aspects. In particular, we believe that there is a need to analyse the state of affairs in the important issue of security guarantees. In this regard it seems the time has come to make new efforts in order to work out a general formula for negative guarantees. Russia is ready to contribute to this exercise.

It seems to us that new conditions are now beginning to take shape, much more favourable than in the past, for solving one of the key tasks in the field of nuclear disarmament - the prohibition of nuclear testing. Currently three nuclear States, Russia, the United States of America and France, are observing officially declared moratoriums. This fact alone points to the possibility of making progress towards agreement on a test ban. We also believe that in the very near future all the nuclear States will be able to give definite support to a start to negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on the prohibition of the nuclear weapon testing. As for Russia, we are ready for such negotiations. We also believe that special contacts on the issue are warranted among the five nuclear Powers. Therefore we support the proposal made by France last November that the representatives of these States in the Conference on Disarmament should take up the joint consideration of these issues. In our opinion experience with the negotiations on chemical weapons demonstrates the possibility of combining multilateral, bilateral and other forms of negotiations in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament in the best possible way. One of the guarantees that a new nuclear arms race will not be unleashed is our proposed arrangement concerning a verifiable ban on the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, which would go a long way towards solving the problem of the irreversibility of nuclear disarmament.

Multilateral efforts to prevent the arms race in outer space still remain a priority area in the activities of the Conference on Disarmament. The most promising first step would be efforts to agree upon measures for confidence-building, transparency and predictability in States' activities in outer space. I think we can already talk about the development of a concrete multilateral arrangement on this issue, which in our opinion would be in the interests of all.

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As you know, the Russian delegation actively supported efforts to add the new issue of transparency in armaments onto the agenda of the Conference. The consideration of this topic at the Conference on Disarmament and the United Nations General Assembly stems from the growing importance of the problems of conventional arms cuts, confidence-building measures and the settlement of regional conflicts. We view transparency in armaments as an important confidence-building measure, a means to strengthen security and remove mutual concerns and misunderstandings. We intend to provide data for the United Nations register on this topic, and to participate actively in discussing transparency problems here in the Conference, which we regard as the most appropriate forum to this end. Bearing in mind the novelty and the profundity of the transparency problem, the diversity and complexity of its component elements, we believe it is worth while first of all to determine more precisely the scope of tasks to be tackled under this agenda item and to establish an order of priorities for addressing them.

In conclusion I should like to say some words concerning the Conference on Disarmament itself. We support the view of the United Nations Secretary-General that the time has come to proceed from exploratory discussions on the reform of the Conference to practical actions. The Conference, in our view, should acquire greater flexibility, which would allow it on the one hand to concentrate efforts on well-defined and urgent issues, and on the other to diversify its methods and forms of operation in the light of the tasks which life itself places before it. In the future the Conference might evolve into a sort of "umbrella forum" under the aegis of which multilateral negotiations might be conducted on disarmament and confidence-building measures with flexibility in determining who would participate in specific negotiations. In particular we should seriously consider the possibility of using the potential of the Conference to solve certain regional problems in the field of security and disarmament. The idea of establishing an international disarmament organization under United Nations auspices is still an important one.

Of course, one of the most important issues in the Conference on Disarmament is the issue of its membership. In principle we see no reason which would prevent the Conference from becoming a universal multilateral body. However, we are ready not to press matters, and we suggest at this stage agreeing on a substantial - about 50 per cent - expansion in the membership of the Conference. Such a decision would make it possible to satisfy the legitimate interest of many States in full-fledged participation in the work of the Conference, an interest which they demonstrated by applying for membership. The practical implementation of these largely unconventional concepts in their entirety might require some time, but consideration of them should begin today, not be postponed for tomorrow. The forthcoming session of the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly in March might be a proper place for reviewing the first results of such discussions. We would like to hope that the intellectual and expert potential to be found in the Conference on Disarmament will be tapped to the fullest extent in this as in other areas of interaction between States.

The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to me and to my country. I also take the liberty to thank

(The President)

him on behalf of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Berasategui. I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Sir Michael Weston.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): At the outset, Mr. President, let me add to the many congratulations you have received since your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I wish you well in the tasks ahead of you. I would also like to extend my delegation's welcome to the recent new arrivals in the CD. We look forward to working with them in the future.

I have asked for the floor today to set out, in summary form, my delegation's present thinking on the future of the CD and, in particular, the issues of its membership and agenda. What I say must inevitably sound rather parochial after Mr. Berdennikov's important statement. I crave your indulgence. At least I can promise to be brief.

The CD is at a crossroads. It had successfully concluded negotiations on the chemical weapons Convention. It now needs to decide on its future. A process of self-examination has begun, and agreement has been reached that attention should be focused on its improved and effective functioning and in particular on the questions of its membership and agenda. The decision of the United Nations General Assembly covering the resumed session of the First Committee requests the Conference to convey to the Chairman of the First Committee the status of its ongoing review of its agenda, composition and methods of work by 20 February. It may be difficult to reach firm decisions by that date, but we should try. Meanwhile, it is clearly important for members of the CD to develop substantive ideas, so that a real contribution can be made to the First Committee's overall reassessment.

The first question to be asked is whether there is life for the CD after the conclusion of the CWC. Is there a role for the CD, if there are no treaties or agreements of the nature or scale of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, the chemical weapons Convention or the biological weapons Convention to be negotiated in the near future, and all weapons of mass destruction are now either restricted or banned by one of the existing treaty regimes? Such questions should not be dismissed out of hand. The CD does have to justify its existence. For our part, however, the United Kingdom recognizes the value of having a framework in place for the negotiation of instruments of disarmament. The advantages of the Conference had included its relatively small and balanced membership and its rule of consensus. I will turn to the question of membership in a moment. But the rule of consensus is, in the United Kingdom's view, vital and must be preserved. This should not, however, preclude the search for new ways to increase the CD's efficiency. The CD should also be open to new ideas which may emerge from the resumed session of the First Committee.

Consultations on the future agenda and membership of the CD have already begun and will occupy a good deal of our time over the coming weeks. In the United Kingdom's view, these issues should be approached in a structured way. We believe that it would be a mistake to revise the agenda and then to admit new members who would have had no opportunity, at least formally, to participate in the decisions on that agenda. If we wish to inject new life into the Conference, any new members should be able to participate fully in

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discussions and decisions on its future from the earliest possible date. Indeed, some of the ideas put forward on the CD's future role cannot be properly assessed until the future membership position is clear. Some indeed may not be feasible at all if membership remains limited - for example the United Nations Secretary-General's idea, expressed in the "New dimensions" report, that the CD could be considered as a permanent review and supervisory body for some existing multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements. A short- or long-term solution on membership should therefore be reached as quickly as possible, so that the expanded membership can decide for itself on the future direction of the Conference.

My delegation does not see a direct relationship between size and efficiency - or size and inefficiency. Big may not always be beautiful. But small may not always be efficient. Expanding the CD's membership is not necessarily incompatible with the consensus rule, nor will it necessarily affect the Conference's efficiency and effectiveness. If necessary, smaller subgroups might be created, for specific negotiating tasks. And there can be no doubt that the more countries who have the opportunity to take part in negotiating a treaty or convention, the greater the chances that the resulting text will be universally acceptable.

The United Kingdom is sympathetic to the idea of letting in all those who apply to join. The main advantage of this suggestion is that it is fair. Nobody interested in participating would be left out, and only those with a genuine interest would participate. We believe that there are various ways to achieve this, without damaging the CD. One way would be to set a time-limit for applications, and at the same time to agree to review the situation again in, say, five years' time. We could in addition ask all existing members to confirm by a certain date that they wish to continue their membership of the CD. Another possibility would be to admit initially those States who have already applied and then, with their participation, take the longer-term decisions on the Conference's future agenda and membership.

Some have argued for a more limited expansion. Some indeed have argued against any expansion at all. We share their concern for the efficiency of the CD as negotiating body, but we believe that experience of multilateral negotiation in other fields has shown that it is possible to operate by consensus with a considerably larger membership than that of the CD today.

As I have said, we believe that formal decisions on the future agenda of the Conference should not be taken until the membership position is clarified. Meanwhile, however, we see advantage in continuing informal discussions on the agenda. Building on the idea put forward last year by our former Swedish colleague, Ambassador Hyltenius, for a merger of agenda items 2 and 3 and 6 and 8 under the heading "Other nuclear issues and new types of weapons of mass destruction", we might aim for an agenda with three main clusters: first, nuclear issues and other weapons of mass destruction; secondly, conventional weapons, transparency and confidence-building measures; and, thirdly, existing agreements. A number of sub-items might then be listed under these clusters, and taken up as and when appropriate. For instance, work done under the heading of transparency and confidence-building might include the negotiation of a standard framework for regional confidence-building measures, and the drafting of an annual declaration of the size and organization of military forces to complement the existing return on military budgets.

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The heading "existing agreements" reflects Dr. Boutros-Ghali's idea that the CD could be considered as a permanent review and supervisory body for some existing multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements. CD members not party to the said agreements have, of course, no formal entitlement to participate in their review or supervision - and to change that would be to discourage greater adherence to those agreements. But work on supervising or reviewing existing agreements might be carried out by individual sub-committees, each consisting only of those members who are also party to the agreement concerned. Ideally, of course all CD members would in due course become parties to all the relevant agreements and thus be able to participate fully in all such work.

These are just a few thoughts on these two important issues. I hope they will help to stimulate the debate over the next few weeks.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United Kingdom, Sir Michael Weston, for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Marín Bosch.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): The delegation of Mexico welcomes the prompt manner in which the Conference on Disarmament has begun its work this year. Once again we congratulate you, Mr. President. Our greetings go to Deputy Minister Berdennikov of the Russian Federation. We welcome our new colleague from Hungary and we wish Ambassador Tibor Tóth all the best.

It is not our intention to take the floor every fortnight in plenary. However, we are doing so today in response to your appeal to delegations to give their views on the report by the Secretary-General entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era" (document A/C.1/47/7). In accordance with its decision A/47/422, the General Assembly invites Member States to submit their views on the Secretary-General's report. It also asks the CD to make recommendations about its future by 15 February 1993 and finally it asks this Conference to provide information about the status of its ongoing review of its agenda, composition and methods of work.

It should be remembered that the basis of the prevailing international disarmament strategy was decided by common agreement by the Members of the United Nations during the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held from 23 May to 1 July 1978. The Final Document of that meeting includes an introduction to the topic of disarmament, a declaration (objectives and purposes), a programme of action (procedures to monitor compliance with obligations entered into) and a section on machinery, deliberations and negotiations for international disarmament (to deal with disarmament problems in their various aspects). The priorities laid down in the 1978 Final Document have not changed. What is more, no member of the international community can deny the validity of the objectives and purposes set forth in the declaration. All of them are enshrined in the United Nations Charter and all of us have recognized them. The dramatic changes that have occurred in international relations in recent years, far from undermining the validity of the Final Document, create conditions more conducive to ending the arms race. As is stated in paragraph 3 of the aforementioned document:

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"Progress on détente and progress on disarmament mutually complement and strengthen each other". It is true that the cold war hampered the proper implementation of the provisions of the 1978 document. But at this time of renewed opportunity, it is necessary not only to confirm its objectives and principles but also to revitalize some aspects of the programme of action and the disarmament machinery.

In order to revitalize the programme of action and the machinery for putting it into practice, it is necessary to follow a procedure similar to that of 1978, in which all - I repeat, all - Member States of the United Nations participate and jointly decide. In disarmament it is not possible to disregard the principles and rules that have been the outcome of a long series of efforts made from the very beginning of the Organization. As with other important issues for the international community, one cannot look only at recent events in evaluating a given situation; instead, they must be viewed from a historical angle. Pragmatism in this topic is only a partial approach in judging situations. The action proposed in "An agenda for peace (preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peace-keeping)" (document A/47/277) should not be seen as an end in itself but as a major complement to the disarmament process, which will help achieve more lasting agreements. We all know that the fundamental problem has been the lack of political will on the part of some States to commit themselves to a real disarmament process, particularly nuclear disarmament. And this is precisely the sphere where, ineluctably, progress must be made if we seek a safer world.

Disarmament, as we have understood it in the United Nations, covers prevention, limitation, reduction and elimination of arms. In negotiating each of these aspects, account has been taken of the political processes that shape international behaviour, which until the end of the cold war prevented any significant advances. The approach suggested by the Secretary-General, focusing the operations proposed in "An agenda for peace" to resolve localized conflicts, may lead to negotiations on all aspects of disarmament in an equally localized fashion, and there may be a risk of arriving at very different results in different regions. Asymmetry in the commitments secured might, translated to the international level, create greater problems unless similar obligations and responsibilities are secured for all States. A pragmatic approach to disarmament makes it impossible to tackle basic problems (as in the case of military doctrines) and may give rise to actions to treat the symptoms rather than the disease. What is termed the use of disarmament measures within the framework of peace enforcement calls for prior agreement on such measures.

The Final Document of 1978 says that "bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations may also play an important part and could facilitate negotiations of multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament" (para. 121). The globalization of disarmament must be the sum of bilateral, regional and multilateral efforts, with participation by all States as appropriate. Globalization must be construed in the sense that all States must undertake to implement disarmament measures and agreements. The argument that the major military Powers must initiate the process and show an example is still valid. The role of the Security Council in maintaining peace and international security is set forth in the United Nations Charter. This role, however, must be seen in the context of the world of the twenty-first century, and therefore the current membership of the Council must be made more democratic. Proposals

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to allow allegedly humanitarian interference in the internal affairs of a State must also be looked at thoroughly and in the light of the above considerations.

Confidence-building measures are without a doubt an important element for international security and must be promoted at every level. Globalization must be taken to mean that all States must undertake to implement them. However, it is the major military Powers that must show an example, in the first place by accepting globalization, without delaying its implementation. The system of agreements and treaties inherited from the cold war period, among them the Final Document of 1978, provides a solid framework for making progress with the disarmament process. The challenge today is not only to put that inheritance into practice, but to supplement the negotiating effort on weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear technology cannot be uninvented, but the production of nuclear weapons can and must be banned. There must also be a halt to the qualitative improvement of existing arsenals. The complete elimination of nuclear weapons remains a priority objective for the international community. The gradual reduction of the number and yield of nuclear tests is an approach that has been proved to be ineffective. It would be a shame to miss the opportunity to ban testing completely, at a time when circumstances are so conducive. We must make this a short-term objective.

We agree that "there can be no justification for any State, anywhere, to acquire the tools and technologies of mass destruction" (para. 27 of document A/C.1/47/7). The way to transform the theory of non-proliferation into concerted action is by making it truly universal and genuine. The ban must also include the nuclear-weapon States. For a non-proliferation system to work, all States everywhere must cease to acquire and further develop the tools and technologies of mass destruction. The provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) must be seen in the proper light, without overlooking the intentions of those who wrote it. Indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT could be arrived at after ensuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being implemented. If this is not the case, we must keep open the option of evaluating compliance with the Treaty, especially compliance by the nuclear-weapon States, before committing ourselves for ever to its provisions. Consequently, the 1995 conference will have to combine the five-year review of the NPT with discussion on its extension. The preparatory process must include discussions on the substance of the issue of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in general, as well as the provisions of the Treaty in particular. A 10-year or 15-year extension, together with a nuclear disarmament programme to be completed in that time scale, would prevent any diminution of the already only slight pressure that non-nuclear-weapon States can bring to bear in the nuclear sphere. The preparatory process for the 1995 NPT conference must also include a dialogue among all States, whether or not they are parties to the Treaty. This will ensure that the basis will be laid for better understanding among all concerned on the main elements of a future universal regime for genuine non-proliferation. Disarmament must continue to be focused on nuclear disarmament, for the very reason that progress in that sphere will open the way to other agreements or other types of weapon. The United Nations must continue to have a central role in disarmament. While it is true that there are new circumstances that must be dealt with, the priorities have not changed. Notable among the new circumstances are the question of destruction

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and storage of weaponry and the conversion of military capabilities for peaceful purposes once the disarmament and arms limitation agreements of recent years have been implemented. These matters are of concern to everyone because they stand between environmental issues and considerable economic adjustments, as the Russian delegation reminded us this morning. However, not all States bear the same responsibility, since the developing countries will only suffer the consequences. The question of conversion would be one of the tasks that the Security Council might follow closely.

The need for a single multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament remains. The Conference on Disarmament must be maintained as such. Experience has shown the difficulties that a negotiating body faces when it has a broad membership, particularly when it works by consensus. The Conference on Disarmament, with almost 40 members, has already reached the limit as a negotiating body. The fundamental problem of membership lies in the fact that if we reconsider the characteristics of the countries that should be members of the Conference, in the light of the new international situation, it is clear that there are some that perhaps should not be here while not all those that should be here are here. The reduction of tension in Europe and the disappearance of East/West military confrontation give us a new outlook on the political balance that is needed. A couple of years ago, on 22 January 1991, my delegation gave a historic overview of how the membership of the CD had evolved since 1962. We will have to reconcile two elements: maintaining the limited size and ensuring representativeness of members.

Taking up another point, the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament should continue to reflect priorities in the field of disarmament. We should avoid unnecessary changes and seek to give the items a proper focus. Concentrating on well-defined and urgent matters is an objective that is not at variance with the nature of the CD.

Existing disarmament agreements have their own mechanisms for review and control. In order for the Conference on Disarmament to include those tasks as well, its membership would have to coincide with that of the agreements under review. The CD has run into this difficulty every time it has tried to deal with international agreements that are not of interest to some members. The Secretariat of the United Nations must be strengthened in the disarmament sphere so that it can respond appropriately to the mandates given it by the General Assembly. Tasks have considerably increased and, far from its operations having been strengthened, the level of importance has been downgraded. In 1978 it was agreed to raise the head of the Department for Disarmament Affairs to the rank of Under-Secretary-General, thereby making it independent of the Under-Secretary-General for political and security affairs. After having been a department headed by an Under-Secretary-General, it has again become an office for disarmament coming under a Director-General at a relatively lower level. The professional staff has also been considerably reduced. This situation places this office in a lower position than in 1978.

In short, it is clear that the new international circumstances demand that the United Nations should act in a very different fashion from that which we have been used to seeing during the cold war. But it is also obvious that any change in the elements agreed in 1978 calls for a similarly unanimous decision by the members of the United Nations. We cannot - and I repeat what

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we said a few weeks back - twist the agreements already reached in this sphere for the sake of alleged pragmatism. Certainly pragmatism does not appear among the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. Neither can the United Nations be asked to play an ever greater role in solving political and military problems while at the same time cuts are made in the Department for Disarmament Affairs. What is more, as experience has shown recently in several countries in what used to be the Warsaw Pact, the application of disarmament agreements is no easy matter and calls for experts as well as money. What would be ideal, of course, would be to convene a new special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. However, the preparatory work for such a session might be lengthy, and the current imperatives rule out any excessive delay in collective decision-making. Hence the decision to resume the work of the First Committee of the General Assembly for a week next March. To ensure the success of the work of the First Committee in this area, it would be desirable to have the views of the greatest possible number of countries, as well as the reports of the Conference on Disarmament. In addition, we should have before us a simple table showing the posts there were, those there are, and those there will be in the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the Secretariat of the United Nations. This would facilitate consideration of this matter in the First Committee. Given the scope of the subject and the little time that the First Committee will have in March, it might be advisable to ask the Chairman of that Committee, Ambassador Nabil Elaraby, to continue consultations, even after the end of the General Assembly's forty-seventh regular session, so as to achieve the broadest possible agreement among all the members of the General Assembly.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Marín Bosch for his thought-provoking statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Germany, Ambassador Hoffmann.

Mr. HOFFMANN (Germany): At the beginning of my first formal intervention in this Conference I should like to say that it gives me particular pleasure to see you, Ambassador Amorim, as the President of the CD. With decisions taken recently under your leadership on the beginning of the substantive work of the CD and the nomination of special coordinators you contributed considerably to a new CD after the CW Convention. I congratulate you on these achievements and wish you similar success during the remaining time in office. It also gives me great pleasure to welcome my new neighbour to my left, and it is very nice to greet a newcomer already in my third week in Geneva.

The reason for my taking the floor today is the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era". I should like to comment on some aspects of this report having in mind that the report covers such a variety of issues that it appears to be too ambitious to deal with it as a whole in one plenary statement - and I cannot even promise to be brief.

Germany considers the Secretary-General's report particularly relevant and timely as it initiates the discussion on the future role of arms control and disarmament in a changed political environment. The changes in the international political environment create new challenges for peace and security. Thus, following our own positive experiences in the past, we suggest that arms control and disarmament should play an even more important

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role on the bilateral, subregional, regional and global level of international relations. In this context, the role of the United Nations and their forums dealing with arms control and disarmament should be to initiate, to encourage, to support and to carry out respective activities whenever needed.

In our view, there are two areas of high priority for fostering international peace and security through the means of arms control and disarmament: the prevention of armed conflicts and the issue of non-proliferation of weapons and related technologies. Let me start with the issue of preventing armed conflicts.

Unfortunately, after the end of the East-West confrontation the temptation to use military means in conflicts has been growing. The increase of peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building operations of the United Nations bear witness to this development. Arms control and disarmament has the potential to prevent military conflicts. It is for this reason that we consider arms control and disarmament to be of particular importance in the new political environment and an indispensable element of preventive diplomacy.

Arms control and disarmament can develop norms and instruments, to be used by members of the United Nations and the Security Council, to survey and whenever necessary to restore security and stability in a region long before the outbreak of a military conflict. For example, armed forces, their size, equipment and training pattern can serve as indicators of peaceful or non-peaceful intentions. Thus, criteria on armed forces could be developed to identify any arms build-up by one State or any arms race between several States exceeding the needs for self-defence.

For universal application, such criteria could be developed in general terms. However, as additional specific criteria would be needed for any particular situation, general criteria would have to be complemented by countries on a subregional or regional level. The existence of universally agreed criteria would serve as an incentive to subregions and regions to invest in such a complementary work. Ceilings for particular arms or the armed forces required for self-defence could be established, in accordance with regional conditions, and thus promote self-restraint in the acquisition of arms or in sustaining armed forces. Thus, such arms control provisions could contribute to substantive disarmament in the conventional field and, at the same time, become an important element in the overall efforts of the international community to maintain peace. Accumulations of arms in excess of such criteria could serve as early-warning indicators to the region concerned as much as to the international community as a whole

For example, the Security Council could take action on the basis of articles 34, 39 and 41 of the Charter of the United Nations by making first a specific request for information to a particular country on its armed forces or armaments, using criteria and provisions developed in arms control forums. Thus, an excessive arms build-up could be identified in accordance with internationally agreed criteria. This would provide a solid basis for any further action by the Security Council. It is in this field that we see new opportunities for the Security Council in preventing military conflicts by using the means of arms control. We are convinced that these few ideas on how arms control and disarmament can contribute to preventing armed conflicts are

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only a starting-point. If taken up by the international community and dealt with in the appropriate arms control forums - this Conference is certainly one of them - a whole system of arms control and disarmament provisions could be developed which would significantly contribute to maintaining international peace.

My second priority item, non-proliferation, has been on the international agenda for a long time; encouraging progress has been made. However, more has to be done. Let me start with the issue of non-proliferation related to weapons of mass destruction before addressing conventional weapons. In our view, to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the three universally accepted legal instruments, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the BW Convention and the CW Convention, form a solid basis to build upon. However, the starting-point for all non-proliferation efforts is universal adherence to these instruments. In the case of the NPT, only recently a number of important countries became parties to the Treaty. Nevertheless, some countries have not yet decided to join the overwhelming majority of States; others, like some new CIS States, have not yet carried out their commitments to accede to the NPT in the shortest possible time. We encourage all States who have not yet done so to sign and ratify the NPT before the 1995 NPT review conference.

The handling of superfluous nuclear material is another issue which has come up in the context of nuclear disarmament between the United States and the Russian Federation and as a consequence of the break-up of the former Soviet Union. Safe storage, transportation and destruction of nuclear weapons and weapons material earmarked for elimination present one of the greatest challenges of current arms control activities related to non-proliferation. In order to prevent proliferation from countries owning nuclear weapons to be destroyed, cooperation in safety and security matters and in the safe and environmentally responsible elimination of these weapons is one of the high-priority tasks. In this context, inter alia, efforts to strengthen IAEA mechanisms should continue.

Turning now to the BW Convention, it also does not yet enjoy full universal adherence. The most important task ahead is to enlarge its support and to increase its participation level. Furthermore, the 1991 BWC review conference agreed to ask States parties to submit certain data as a confidence-building measure. The international community should recognize that this first step towards a BWC verification regime needs support. This would also increase the credibility of ongoing activities to identify and examine further verification measures for the BW Convention. We feel fully committed to this process of improving the verification provisions of the BW Convention.

To achieve the total elimination of chemical weapons, we all made a great step forward in 1992. We are encouraged by the broad participation of States in the signing ceremony in Paris in January 1993. We hope for early ratification by all signatories. At the same time we earnestly hope that Arab countries that have not yet signed the CW Convention will soon join the overwhelming majority of States. While we agree that any decision in this context must be taken in view of national security considerations, we have difficulties to understand how one can ask for a zone free of weapons of mass

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destruction in the Middle East on the one side, a goal we fully support, and on the other side miss the opportunity to rid, as a first step, the Middle East region from chemical weapons.

Talking now about proliferation or non-proliferation of conventional weapons we must recognize the legitimacy of conventional weapons. The transfer of arms and related technologies, however, may create problems if weapons and technologies acquired exceed the needs for self-defence and establish capabilities for aggression. Germany is deeply concerned about the growing concentration of conventional weapons in certain regions of the world as well as about certain transfers of weapons, which could lead to a destabilization of entire regions. In our view, therefore, international action is required in order to establish a regime of internationally accepted and implemented restraint in exports and imports of conventional arms, particularly in situations of tension and conflict. Such international action should cover the following areas: transparency in all transfers of conventional arms and related technologies; agreement on common principles for the transfer of conventional arms and related technologies; and development of procedures to prevent or even redress regional instabilities created by excessive arms build-ups.

With the adoption of resolution 46/36 L, a universal and non-discriminatory register of conventional arms has been established. This is a first and important step towards more transparency in the transfer of conventional arms. Germany is committed to provide data as required; we hope for large and equally unconditional participation from countries around the world. As a follow-up, after worldwide participation is emerging, we hope for further steps towards an expansion of the register and towards closer international cooperation with a view to self-restraint in arms transfers. However, transparency in transfers of conventional arms and related technologies is not an end in itself, as the distinguished Ambassador from India rightly pointed out a few days ago. Instead, its political value emerges when it can give assurance to countries concerned at the subregional and regional level that arms transfers are carried out only in accordance with the needs for self-defence. I mentioned some ideas on the furthering of this goal before, and I am confident other members of the CD will take up this issue in order to add their own ideas.

As I said at the beginning of my intervention, the report of the Secretary-General covers a complexity of issues. I have commented only on a few of them; however, as the draft of the CD reply will be discussed in this forum, I reserve the right for my delegation to add further comments.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Germany for his important statement and for the very kind words he addressed to me. I might add, however, that whatever achievement we have made was the result of collective sense of commitment and goodwill. Further success will depend on the same factors as well as on the spirit of compromise we can collectively display.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I see the representative of Hungary.

Mr. BOYTHA (Hungary): Mr. President, I just want to thank you for the kind words with which you introduced me to the Conference, and I am obliged to

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the distinguished speakers of today's plenary for their friendly response to this introduction. I thank you for the confidence you extended to me and I appreciate, in particular, the tribute you so kindly paid to my predecessor, Ambassador Tibor Tóth, for the work he has done here over the past years. I would like to assure you, Ambassador Amorim, and all members of the Conference that I and my expert colleagues will do our best in order to continue the active participation of Hungary in the CD work as has been the case over the past years, and I wish you continued success in presiding over this Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank Ambassador Boytha and I am sure that we can count on the continued active and intelligent participation of the Hungarian delegation in this plenary.

I wish now to turn to another subject. As I indicated earlier, the consultations have now concluded on the appointment of the chairmen of the ad hoc committees on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and on transparency in armaments. Accordingly, we shall proceed now to the relevant decisions. I propose as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Ambassador Romulus Neagu of Romania.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I now put before you the appointment of Ambassador Kia Tabatabaee of the Islamic Republic of Iran as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I extend to the two chairmen of the ad hoc committees my congratulations on their appointment and wish them success in the performance of their duties.

In connection with our plenary meeting on Thursday, may I recall that in consultation with the coordinators we agreed to start it at 10.30 a.m? The first speaker will be Her Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Baroness Margaretha at Ugglas.

That concludes our work for today, and I intend now to adjourn this plenary meeting, but before doing so, I wish to remind you that immediately after this plenary meeting, informal open-ended consultations will be held with the aim of having a preliminary exchange of views on the Secretary-General's report "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era". Since, after consultations, I heard no objections to the participation of non-members in that meeting, I would like to invite them to attend. The informal consultations will take place in this room in about five minutes.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 4 February, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.